This study examines whether the player draft used in the Australian Football League (AFL) since 1986 has caused clubs to tank; that is, to seek to lose matches in order to obtain improved draft choices. A comparison of clubs' performances in regular season matches played before and after introduction of the draft provides no evidence that clubs have engaged in tanking. The main potential explanations for the absence of tanking in the AFL are the relatively low benefits to clubs from tanking, and limited opportunities for them to engage in this behaviour.
Introduction
The 16 club Australian Football League (AFL) is the premier Australian football competition. Since 1986, a reverse-order draft system has been the primary mechanism for assigning new players to AFL clubs. A regular feature of recent media coverage of the AFL competition is the contention that clubs are 'tanking'; that is, deliberately losing matches in order to obtain higher selections in the draft. 1 Considerable pressure has therefore been placed on the competition's organisers to abolish or significantly reform the player draft system. 2 That mechanisms and policies intended to achieve particular objectives can have perverse effects is by now well understood. In the case of player drafts in professional sporting competitions, the way in which perverse effects might arise is relatively straightforward. Organisers of professional sporting competitions often seek to enhance competitive balance between clubs by using a reverse-order player draft to assign new or uncontracted players to clubs. The reverse-order feature of the draft means that clubs with the poorest win/loss records in a season get to choose the most highly rated players to add to their playing lists for the next season. Hence, especially for clubs that have been eliminated from contention for winning the league championship, there may be an incentive to deliberately lose matches in order to obtain higher selections in the player draft.
A recent study has examined perverse incentive effects associated with the player draft mechanism in the US National Basketball Association (NBA). Taylor and Trogdon (2002) find that the draft for assigning new players to clubs in the NBA competition appears to have given an incentive to lower-ranked clubs to lose matches (pp.38-39):
"…in the 1983-84 season we find that eliminated [from playoffs] teams were approximately 2.5 times more likely to lose than noneliminated teams…This was expected because the NBA rewarded those teams with lower league rankings with better draft choices. However, in the 1984-85 season, the NBA restructured its draft rules to give any nonplayoff team an equal chance at obtaining the most prized draft selections. We find no statistically significant difference between the behaviour of playoff and non-playoff teams in 1984-85." 3 In this paper we undertake a similar analysis of the effect on clubs' performances of the introduction of a player draft to the AFL. Two main aspects of the AFL player draft are investigated -first, the National Draft that assigns clubs choices of new players in reverse order of their league ranking in the preceding season; and second, the Special Assistance system that has at times provided clubs that win less than a specified number of games in a season with extra priority draft choices. To examine both aspects of the player draft a 'difference-in-difference' approach is used. This approach involves comparing the change in performance between the pre-draft and draft eras of clubs that could have had an incentive to lose matches in draft era, with the change in performance of clubs that would have had no difference in their incentive to lose matches between pre-draft and draft eras. In particular we argue that the Special Assistance system, whereby in some years a club was able to obtain an extra top-rated draft choice for maintaining a low winning percentage, appears to provide a strong test for existence of perverse incentive effects. 4 Our main finding is that there is no evidence that performance of clubs in the AFL has been systematically affected by the player draft system. We suggest that the main potential explanations for why the AFL player draft does not appear to have caused perverse incentive effects are the limited scope for clubs to actually engage in tanking behaviour, and the relatively small marginal effect of an extra or higher-rated drafted player on future club performance. The same factors also can explain the difference in findings in this study from Taylor and Trogdon's (2002) study of the NBA.
Analysis of the player draft mechanism in the AFL therefore provides an important case study of how the effect of a mechanism will depend on the environment in which it is applied and the details of the mechanism. This is consistent with a central message from the emerging economic design literature that 'details matter '. 5 In the next section background details on the player draft system in the AFL are presented. Section 3 develops the main hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the empirical method, and results from econometric analysis are presented in section 5. Section 6 provides some extra empirical analysis. An interpretation of the main findings is provided in section 7, and concluding remarks are in section 8.
About the AFL player draft system
The Victorian Football League (VFL) (renamed the Australian Football League (AFL) in 1990) introduced a National Draft as a player allocation mechanism in 1986.
Introduction of the player draft was a response to a combination of problems that had arisen in the Australian football competition in the early 1980s including financial instability of the VFL and its clubs, escalating and unsustainable player salaries and transfer fees, declining match attendances, and several challenges to the legality of the VFL's labour market controls. 6 The first National Draft occurred in late 1986 with players chosen then being eligible to play for clubs in the 1987 season. In this draft clubs were each allowed to choose five players from the Victorian country area and from other states; but players from the Victorian metropolitan area were still allocated using the geographic zoning system. Draft choices were made in reverse order of clubs' finishing positions in the 1986 season. A club's assigned choice in the National Draft could be traded for players currently contracted to another club. Drafted players were bound to a club for three years (Dabscheck, 1989, p.71; Booth, 1996, p.26) .
The basic features of the original National Draft -for example, draft choices being made in reverse order of finishing position in the preceding season, and clubs being restricted to trading choices in the draft for current players at other clubs -have remained the same through to the present. Many details of the player draft system however have undergone reform since its introduction.
First, the significance of the National Draft for clubs has grown over time.
Assignment of new players to clubs has come to occur almost exclusively through the National Draft, and players chosen in the National Draft have become an increasingly important determinant of a club's stock of playing talent. In 1991 the system of allocating players in metropolitan Victoria through geographic zoning was abolished, and these players were henceforth assigned to clubs through the National Draft. As well, the entry of clubs from Western Australia and South Australia into the AFL competition in the 1980s and 1990s meant that local competitions in those states ceased to provide a viable professional career opportunity for footballers, which has effectively expanded the pool of talent from which AFL clubs can choose in the National Draft. Reduction in the maximum size of club player lists, and an increase in the number of new players that a club could choose in the National Draft to eight in 1988, have also together meant that the National Draft has become an increasingly important determinant of a club's stock of playing talent.
Second, the AFL has supplemented the National Draft by allowing at various times clubs to make 'priority' selections (see Booth, 1996, pp.27-28; AFL, 1997 AFL, , 2003 .
Generally these selections are made as the first choices in the National Draft prior to the regular 'reverse-order' draft selections. There have been two main rationales for granting priority choices. One is to enable new entrants to the AFL competition to have player lists that make them competitive -for example, Fremantle was granted priority selections prior to its entry to the competition in 1995. The other 'Special Assistance' rationale has been to assist clubs that have performed poorly.
There were three main phases of provision of Special Assistance for poor performance prior to 2005. From 1986 to 1993 such assistance was provided on an ad-hoc basis; for example, priority choices were given to the three clubs at the bottom of the league table in 1993. From 1994 to 1996 clubs were eligible for a priority choice on the basis of the weighted average of their winning percentages in the previous four seasons. From 1997 to 2005 a club that won five matches or less in the preceding season would receive one priority selection of a player in the National Draft. The AFL Player Rules (AFL, 2003, p.43) Booth, 1996, p.27) .
Fourth, it is also important to note the existence of other types of labour market regulations. A salary cap on player payments for each club was introduced for the 1985 season and still exists, being $6.74M. per club in 2005. The size of a club's playing list, which was set at a maximum level of 50 players in 1983, has subsequently been adjusted downwards to the current maximum of 40 players (Macdonald and Booth, 2007) .
Theory
For the analysis of incentive effects of the AFL draft we will emphasise two main aspects of the player draft system: the reverse-order National Draft, and the extra priority choices that clubs with poor performance have been able to receive through the Special Assistance system. The central hypothesis to be tested is whether these aspects of the player draft system provided an incentive for clubs to lose matches in order to obtain higher draft choices.
In what circumstances would the draft system potentially cause an incentive for a club to lose matches? One situation where this could occur would be where clubs have lexicographic-type preferences towards winning the league championship -such as having an objective function that puts no weight on performance in a season once the club no longer has a chance of winning the premiership in that season. In this case, a club eliminated from contention for the championship in the current season, would be expected in that season to adopt the strategy that maximizes the quality of players it will have available in future seasons. 8 Introduction of the National Draft and the Special Assistance system mean that a club can potentially improve its quality of players in future seasons by having the highest draft choices possible in the current season; that is, achieving the lowest possible finishing position on the league table or by not having a winning percentage above a specified level. As Taylor and Trogdon (2002, p.27 ) then argue: '…as the reward for losing increases, teams should exert less winning effort and more losing effort, and performance should decline.' Exerting more 'losing effort' might for example involve choosing a team or adopting a training regime that does not maximize a club's chance of winning a match.
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The first main hypothesis to be tested is with regard to the introduction of the reverseorder National Draft. We examine whether introduction of the draft caused a decrease in the probability of winning matches for clubs eliminated from contention from finals. The incentive to lose extra matches would be that by doing so a club can obtain a higher choice in the draft. For example, a club that, by losing extra matches can change its finishing position in the regular season from 2 nd last to bottom, would move from having the 2 nd choice in the National Draft to having the 1 st choice. A supplementary hypothesis is that any effect of the National Draft on the probability of winning matches for teams eliminated from contention from finals will have increased over time, since it appears that the importance of the National Draft has grown due to its greater scope and smaller club playing lists.
The second main hypothesis that we test involves the Special Assistance priority choice system. There have been three phases of this system, and we argue that incentive effects to lose matches would have been strongest in the third phase. This is because it was in this phase that the effect of a club's performance in the current season on whether a priority choice would be received in the next season was greatest.
For example, consider the case of a club that has won less than five matches in the current season. In the first Special Assistance phase 
Empirical model and data
Estimation is undertaken using a probit model on match-level data. Separate models are used for testing each of the two main hypotheses. Where i = club; j = round (1, 2,…, (n-1), n); and t = season (1968, 1969,…, 2005 
ijt e
In this model is a dummy variable that equals one where club i has won less than or equal to five matches prior to round j in season t so that it would have retained eligibility for a priority draft choice in the phase of the Special Assistance system that operated from 1997 to 2005, equals one where a club is playing a match against an opponent that has prior to that round had won five matches or less, = (1986 to 1992, and 1993 to 1996) are also included.
Since different priority choice systems operated at those times that would have had a weaker incentive effect than the system from 1997 to 2005 it is predicted that coefficients on these variables should be smaller in magnitude or insignificant.
Finally, we control for matches where a club that would have retained eligibility for Special Assistance in the phase from 1997 to 2005 was playing against another club that also retained this eligibility, as once again in such matches we would be considering two clubs, both of which may have an incentive to seek to lose the match.
We do this by using the set of dummy variables , as well as the same dummy variables interacted with the time intervals corresponding to the different phases of the Special Assistance system.
Model (3) club is playing a match against an opponent that will lose eligibility for Special
Assistance if it wins its match in round j. Model (3) is then:
hastate , ahstate , hhstate ) Throughout, we test for effects of the draft system on club performance by restricting attention to the final six rounds of the season. This is because it is only at this stage of the season, where there just over one-quarter of the regular season remaining, that clubs are likely to begin to take account of considerations regarding to player draft choices for the next season. In any case, it will be apparent from our results that this restriction does not constitute a major constraint on the analysis.
To control for other determinants of a club's likelihood of winning a match, apart from the incentive effects of the drafts, we include a variety of explanatory variables.
First, to control for the quality of a club and its opponent in a match, the winning percentages of that club and its opponent prior to round j in season t, 15 The total number of match-level observations is 10,342.
Results

a. Effect of reverse-order National Draft
Estimates of model (1), which tests the effect of the reverse-order National Draft, are reported in Table 2 . The first column presents results from a restricted model that includes as explanatory variables only the dummy variables for clubs having been eliminated from participating in the finals series of matches. The second column reports a model that also controls for where a club that has been eliminated from the finals series plays a match against another club eliminated from the finals series. The third column includes the full set of explanatory variables. In testing for effects of the National Draft in the final six rounds of a season, dummy variables for these rounds have been aggregated into variables for matches played in the 1 st or 2 nd last rounds, in the 3 rd or 4 th last rounds, or in the 5 th or 6 th last rounds.
The key finding is that there is no evidence of any significant change in the likelihood of winning matches for clubs that have been eliminated from participating in the finals series between the periods prior to and after introduction of the reverse-order National Draft. Clubs eliminated from participation in the finals series are less likely to win matches in the last six rounds than other clubs; for example, in the full model the estimated effect on 'elim12' implies that a club eliminated from the finals has a probability of winning a match in the final two rounds that is 17.8 percentage points lower than a club that had not been eliminated. Hence knowing a club has been eliminated from participating in the finals series is informative about its quality.
However, none of the interactions between the dummy variable for being eliminated from the finals series and the dummy variable for the draft period, for example 'elim1286-05', is found to be significant. Therefore we can infer that clubs that had been eliminated from the finals were not more likely to lose matches in the draft era.
To test whether there might have been a change in the likelihood of winning matches in any sub-period of the draft era we also estimated a version of the model where the dummy variable for having been eliminated from the finals is interacted with dummy variables for sub-periods of the draft period (1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, and 2001-05) . But for none of these sub-periods was there found to be a significant effect.
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Further evidence on the effects of the reverse-order feature of the National Draft is presented in Table 3 . Predicted winning percentages for clubs involved in each match are derived, and a predicted winner of that match is determined as the club with the highest predicted probability of winning. 17 Matches are then divided between those that clubs eliminated from participation in the finals series would have been expected to win and expected to lose, and we compare the outcome of these matches between the pre-draft (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) and draft (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) eras. Tanking could be manifested either as a club winning a smaller proportion of matches than it was predicted to win, or losing a larger proportion of matches than it was predicted to lose, in the draft era than the pre-draft era. Table 3 shows that neither of these outcomes is apparent; in fact if anything there is some evidence that clubs won more matches that they were predicted to lose in the draft era, although the effect is not significant.
b. Effect of Special Assistance system
Results from tests for the effect of the Special Assistance system are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows results from Model (2) which tests for the effect of eligibility for Special Assistance in the National Draft. Columns (1) and (2) Another way to test the effect of the National Draft is to examine whether the difference in aggregate scores between winning and losing clubs in matches in which a club eligible for Special Assistance is playing alters between the pre-draft and draft eras. Clubs that are eligible for Special Assistance are not predicted to win many matches, and hence it is possible that a greater incentive to lose matches could be manifested in larger losing margins rather than losing a larger number of matches.
Results from a model which tests this proposition, using the percentage difference in the aggregate scores of clubs in each match, are shown in columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 . The significant negative coefficients on 'pap1297-05' do appear to indicate that the losing margin is significantly larger in the final two rounds of the season in matches involving a club eligible for Special Assistance in the phase from 1997 to 2005 than in the pre-Draft era. Before concluding that this is evidence of an effect of the draft system, it is also necessary however to note that there is a very similar effect estimated in the final two rounds in the earlier draft phases ('pap1294-96' and 'pap1286-93') when the effect of the Special Assistance system on incentives would have been predicted to be smaller. 18 Hence it does not seem possible to conclude that analysis of the size of losing margins provides evidence of an incentive effect due to the Special Assistance system.
Results from Model (3), which tests the effect of 'borderline' eligibility for Special Assistance, by comparing the performance of clubs involved in matches where winning that match would cause them to have won more than five matches, between the phase from 1997 to 2005 and other time periods, are presented in Table 5 .
Columns (1) and (2) present results with restricted and full sets of explanatory variables. In both columns we control for matches in which a club with borderline eligibility for Special Assistance played a match against another club with borderline eligibility. Columns (3) and (4) present the same models but also include dummy variables to control for matches in which a club with 'borderline' eligibility for Special Assistance played a match against another club that was eligible for Special
Assistance. Once again, there is no evidence of the Special Assistance system having affected club performance. The baseline effects for a club that is 'borderline' are significant and negative. For example, the coefficient on 'bpap12' shows that a club that was in the position in the final two rounds of having won more than five matches if it wins its next match, is on average 25.1 percentage points less likely to win that match than other clubs. However, for none of the versions of the model estimated is the interaction of this effect with the phase from 1997 to 2005, 'bpap1697-05', significant. 19 Hence there is no evidence that the Special Assistance system caused 'borderline' clubs to be more likely to lose matches in this phase. Table 6 reports how the performance of clubs with borderline eligibility for Special
Assistance has compared with predicted performance in the last six rounds of the season between the pre-Draft and Draft time periods. There is no significant difference across the time periods in the proportion of matches that clubs with borderline eligibility lose out of the matches they are predicted to lose. Due to a small number of observations it is not possible to test for whether there is a statistically significant difference in the proportions of matches that clubs win out of the matches they are predicted to win.
c. Other explanatory variables
Other results on the determinants of the likelihood of clubs winning matches seem plausible and support the robustness of the estimated models. First, the likelihood of winning is strongly increasing with a club's winning percentage and decreasing in its opponent's winning percentage. Second, clubs are more likely to win matches against clubs that have been eliminated from finals or are eligible for Special Assistance draft choices. Third, there is a significant home ground advantage, but no effect where both clubs are playing at their home ground; and no effect associated with whether a team is playing inter-state once the home ground effect is controlled for.
d. Robustness checks
We are able to undertake several checks on the robustness of our findings. First, we examine the predictive power of the model used to estimate the determinants of match outcomes. We again use estimates from a basic form of the model to predict each club's probability of winning a match, and the club with the highest predicted probability in that match is designated as the predicted winner of the match. This forecast outcome is compared with the actual outcome. Results from a comparison of predicted and actual outcomes are shown in Table 7 . On average the model 20 correctly predicts the outcome in about 65 per cent of matches. This is very close to the average success rate of expert forecasters; for example, Amor and Griffiths (2004) calculate 
Some extra empirical analysis of tanking
The econometric analysis that has been undertaken thus far suggests there is no evidence of systematic tanking by AFL clubs that could be attributed to either the reverse-order National Draft or to the opportunity to obtain Special Assistance. How With regard to the fan in the street's first response, it is important to acknowledge that while our findings can be interpreted as showing that there is no evidence of systematic or significant tanking behaviour by AFL clubs in the draft era, the econometric method we use is unlikely to have sufficient power to rule out the possibility that tanking occurred in a small number of matches. As well, our approach for evaluating whether tanking occurred uses predictions of match outcomes that are based on clubs' previous performances within a season, and does not take into account the actual circumstances that existed in any match. These caveats should not be taken however to mean that tanking has happened. Rather they define limits on the extent to which it is possible to conclude from our study that tanking has not occurred.
Our feeling about the second response is that properly constructed descriptive statistics in fact provide little evidence in support of tanking behaviour by AFL clubs.
Appropriate descriptive statistics for evaluating the Special Assistance system should compare the whole of the phase of that system from 1997 to 2005 with a pre-draft period, and need to include both clubs finishing with the equivalent of five and a half or six wins as 'just over' the threshold for eligibility for Special Assistance and four and a half or five wins as 'just under' the threshold. We do this in Figure 1, 
Discussion
Why is there no evidence of tanking from either the reverse-order National Draft or the Special Assistance system in the AFL? One approach to answering this question is to think in terms of the benefits and costs of tanking. The benefits that a club can obtain by losing matches will depend on how this will affect the draft choices it obtains, and on the value of obtaining those higher draft choices. The costs are likely to consist of any adverse consequences for individual club members (players and/or coaches) or to club revenue from losing extra matches.
There are a variety of reasons for why the marginal benefit from an improved draft choice in the AFL may be relatively low. First, for our sample period AFL teams have consisted of 20-22 players of whom 18 are on the playing field at any time.
Hence, the effect of an extra high-ability player on club performance may be relatively low, especially compared to other sporting competitions such as the US NBA where a team consists of a much smaller number of players.
Second, benefits from higher draft choices depend on the capacity to correctly identify player quality. Other analysis we have undertaken (Borland et al., 2008) shows that in the AFL, at least in the initial period in which the player draft operated, clubs had significant difficulty in estimating player quality. For example, for the first five years of the National Draft, players drafted in the 1 st round were selected to play in only 17 per cent of matches in which they could have been chosen in the seven years after being drafted (compared to 11 per cent for 2 nd and 3 rd round draft choices).
This contrasts with the NBA where our analysis shows that -for the seasons analysed by Taylor and Trogdon (2002) -players drafted at the end of those seasons generally played 40 to 50 percent of game time in their first seven years after being drafted.
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One reason for this difference may be the existence of collegiate basketball competitions in the United States. Because of the older age of participants and participation in college sport over several years, the ability of potential players may be able to be more accurately identified in the NBA than through junior Australian football competitions (see for example Spurr, 2000) . Hence the benefits from obtaining a higher draft choice, especially where this was simply a matter of for example a choice one or two higher-ranked than otherwise, are likely to have been relatively low in the AFL.
Third, the AFL has mainly drawn players exclusively from within Australia. Drawing from a relatively small population may also imply a relatively low marginal benefit from improved draft choices. Assuming that ability can be characterised by a singledimension indicator of ability, this situation could be represented as the AFL drawing a small sample from a population distribution, whereas a competition such as the US NBA, which draws players from any country where basketball is played, is effectively drawing a large sample from the population distribution. This is likely to mean that the absolute ability of the highest ability players will be higher in the NBA than AFL;
and where the effect of higher player ability on team performance is positive and increasing, this absolute ability effect suggests that the value of a higher draft choice will be greater in the NBA than AFL.
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A related possibility is that in the AFL it is a combination of individual characteristics that determine player ability, and that therefore the distribution of ability will be relatively concentrated. In the case where any individual characteristic has a distribution that is skewed to the right, and supposing that the effect of individual characteristics on player ability in the AFL is multiplicative, then by the central limit theorem, the distribution of player ability will be more concentrated in the AFL than in another competition, such as the US NBA, where it might be argued that a singledimension characteristic as 'height' is very important as a measure of player ability (see for example, Berri et al., 2005, and also Roy, 1951) . This would provide a further explanation for why an improved draft choice might have relatively low marginal benefit in the AFL, again especially compared to a competition such as the US NBA.
The main potential cost to a club from losing extra matches that it seems possible to identify is that clubs with poor winning records are more likely to dismiss coaching and playing staff. In Table 8 Differences in the effects of the AFL and NBA player draft systems on incentives to lose matches seem consistent primarily with greater benefit from tanking in the US NBA than AFL. For example, differences in details of the competitions -such as size of teams and the populations from which clubs' playing lists are drawn -are consistent with much higher benefits from having higher draft choices in the reverseorder draft in the NBA than AFL.
Conclusion
In this study we have examined whether aspects of the player draft mechanism in the AFL have been associated with perverse incentive effects. Using data on all AFL matches played between 1968 and 2005 the study finds that: (a) Clubs eligible for Special Assistance during the period where any team that won five matches or less would receive an extra priority choice in the player draft (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) were no more likely to lose matches in the last six rounds of the season than similarly-performed clubs in other seasons; and (b) Clubs eliminated from the finals in the post-draft era are found to be no more likely to lose matches in the last six rounds of the season than similarly performed clubs prior to the introduction of the draft. On the basis of these findings we conclude that there is no evidence that the AFL player draft has caused an incentive for clubs to lose matches to receive higher draft choices.
The findings in this study for the AFL draft contrast with recent evidence from the NBA in the United States, where it was found that the likelihood of teams that had been eliminated from contention for the playoffs winning matches was significantly related to the scope to improve a club's position in the draft for new players. Our main explanation for the different findings is differences in the benefits of tanking between the competitions. The nature of the competitions and details of the draft mechanisms appear to give a greater incentive and opportunity for NBA clubs to seek to deliberately lose matches than in the AFL.
One implication from our findings is to suggest circumstances where sporting leagues would be likely to need to take greater account of potential perverse incentive effects in designing draft mechanisms. Such incentive effects seem likely to be greater in sporting competitions where any individual player who is drafted will constitute a relatively large fraction of the team; or where clubs are able more precisely to identify player ability prior to the draft. The study can also be argued to provide an illustration of the general point that how a mechanism affects behaviour is likely to depend on its details, and on the environment in which the mechanism is applied.
Even with what might seem a fairly specific mechanism such as a player draft, applied in what might seem to be the homogenous environment of a professional sporting competition, it is evident that details matter.
Endnotes
1. An impression of this coverage can be obtained from the comment by a leading current player that: "There seems little incentive for teams in 14 th , 15 th and 16 th spot to win games" (Judd, 2006) . Other recent newspaper articles have titles such as 'To the loser the spoils' (Niall, 2005) ; 'No incentive in priority pick system' (Johnson, 2005) ; 'Tanks for nothing, Carlton' (Butler and O'Donoghue, 2007) ; and 'Eliminate the tanking temptation: Malthouse' (Broad, 2007) .
2. One commentator has for example written that: 'Forget about using only the finishing positions after the finals to determine the draft pecking order. It is too simplistic and open to manipulation' (Stevens, 2007) . (2003) for a general introduction to design issues associated with sporting competitions. Other studies have used player draft mechanisms in sporting competitions to study a variety of aspects of behaviour -such as sunk cost effects (Staw and Hoang, 1995, and Camerer and Weber, 1999) , and biases in decisionmaking (Massey and Thaler, 2005) .
See Syzmanski
5. McMillan (2002, p.14) notes that "For markets…it is the details of design that determine whether they work well; and equally, it might also be said that it is the details that determine how any mechanism works (see also Roth, 2002) .
6. Prior to the introduction of the player draft system the labour market for VFL footballers was regulated through a system whereby: (a) Players living in the state of Victoria were initially allocated to clubs on the basis of residential location through assignment of exclusive metropolitan and country geographic zones to each club; (b) Players living in other states (than Victoria) who had played 100 games in that state could be recruited by VFL clubs through a reverse-order draft system that allowed each club to choose two players each year with choices being in reverse order of finishing position on the league table; and (c) Players already contracted to a club in the VFL could only transfer to another club with permission of the 'owning' club, which would usually involve payment of a transfer fee to that club. For overviews of the evolution of AFL labour market regulations, see Dabscheck (1975 Dabscheck ( , pp.180-83), (1985 Dabscheck ( , pp.2-4), and (1989 and Booth (1996, pp.21-25) . 7. A club that wins a match is awarded four premiership points, clubs that draw a match are awarded two premiership points each, and a club that loses a match receives zero points. Hence a club could attain 20 premiership points in a variety of ways -for example, winning five matches and losing all other matches, or winning three matches, drawing two matches, and losing all other matches. To simplify exposition in the remainder of the paper we refer to the Special Assistance system from 1997 to 2005 as applying where a club wins five matches or less.
8. The championship winner (generally known as the premier) in the AFL is decided through a finals (playoff) series of matches that involve a specified number of top teams after a regular season of matches. Hence a club that is eliminated from contention for competing in the finals series is not able to win the premiership, and so it is clubs eliminated from competing in the finals that we regard as potentially having an incentive to engage in tanking behaviour. 9. A difficulty is that some types of behaviour that could be interpreted as tanking behaviour might also be interpreted as an optimal response to preparing a club eliminated from playing in the finals for the next season. For example, leaving some key players out of a team at the end of a season in order to allow them to have surgery so that they have maximum preparation time for the next season may be an optimal strategy 'per se' and not primarily done with the intention of obtaining higher draft choices. See for example, Connolly (2006) and Le Grand and Conn (2006) . 10. Matches that are drawn are coded as a win for both clubs. Omitting these matches (which constitute only 0.8 per cent of the total matches) from the analysis has no effect on the main findings.
11. Our approach may classify some clubs to have been eliminated from finals before this is actually the case. For example, in the numerical illustration just used, it is likely that, with four matches remaining, there would be some scenario under which the number of matches a club would need to win to make the finals would only be 11. Taylor and Trogdon (2002) use an alternative approach that defines a club to be eliminated from contention for the playoffs if it is statistically impossible for that club to qualify for the playoffs; that is, if there are n rounds remaining in the regular season and a club has n+1 wins less than the club that would currently be the last club to qualify for the playoffs. This approach has the opposite disadvantage of counting clubs as still being in contention for finals when this may be a very low probability event. For example, with 5 rounds remaining a club may be 5 matches behind the club that would at that stage be the last club to qualify for playoffs -but if the club that is behind must play 5 clubs above it on the league ladder in the remaining 5 matches, then it is difficult to think the club would put significant weight on the likelihood of qualifying for finals.
12. Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for explanatory variables.
13. Checking of data on end of season club order, and on location of matches, was done using Rodgers and Browne (1996) (for 1968 to 1995) 15. Prior to round 1 all measures would be indeterminate, and prior to round 2 zero or 100%. Table 2 reports these results. Table 3 reports the probit model used to predict clubs' winning probabilities.
Appendix
18. An F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that coefficients on the dummy variables for eligibility for Special Assistance are equal across the time periods 1986-1993, 1994-1996 and 1997-2005 (at 1% level of significance).
19. Due to a small number of observations it is necessary to aggregate some estimated effects for models (2) and (3) over the last six rounds of the season, rather than groups of two rounds. Table 3. 21. See Appendix Table 4. 22. See Appendix Table 5. 23. Effects from increasing player ability on team performance could be positive and increasing where, for example, there are external spill-over effects from a player to other players on the team (Rosen, 1982) . Also relevant is that for a club that has profit maximization as its objective, there may be 'superstar' effects associated with players of high absolute ability that would make the value of higher ability players positive and increasing (see for example, Rosen, 1981, and Hausman and Leonard, 1997) .
See Appendix
24. It is also important to recognise that a further implication is likely to be that the relative difference in ability between the highest ability players drafted will be greater in the AFL than NBA. So that where, for example, the effect of higher player ability on team performance is roughly linear, this might imply that the value of a higher draft choice will be greater in the AFL than NBA. To test these predictions we generated random vectors of N(0,1) observations with an 'NBA' vector 1500 observations long, and an 'AFL vector' 100 observations long (to correspond to the difference in size of populations in the US and Australia). Each vector was simulated 10,000 times, and an average of the top 5 order statistics for each vector calculated. For the AFL these are 2. 506, 2.148, 1.941, 1.804, 1.688; and for the NBA are 3.359, 3.076, 2.928, 2.825, 2.745 . These findings are consistent with top choices in the NBA draft having higher absolute ability, but a larger difference between the ability of top draft choices in the AFL.
25. For example, between 1968 and 1985 , clubs that would have had borderline eligibility for Special Assistance between 1997 and 2005 were only predicted to win 4 matches, and out of the matches they were predicted to lose only won 11 matches. Note: Estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects from probit models. Marginal effects are the change in the probability of winning a match of a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, or for a 1-unit change in a continuous variable. Estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) are from an OLS model. In columns (1) and (2) p-values are in parentheses. In columns (3) and (4) standard errors are in parentheses. Note: Estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects from probit models. Marginal effects are the change in the probability of winning a match of a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, or for a 1-unit change in a continuous variable. Estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) are from an OLS model. In columns (1) and (2) p-values are in parentheses. In columns (3) and (4) standard errors are in parentheses. 1997-2005 1977-1985 Note: Coefficient estimates are marginal effects on the probability that a coach separates from a club in season t estimated from a probit model. Estimates show the effect of a 1 percentage point change in winning percentage, and a change from 0 to 1 in whether a club misses the playoffs. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Data sources: AFL data from Lovett (2007) . NBA data from www.database.basketball.com. Note: All estimates reported are marginal effects from probit models. Marginal effects are the change in the probability of winning a match of a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, or for a 1-unit change in a continuous variable. p-values are in parentheses. Note: There are 7 seasons in which no matches were played by clubs with borderline eligibility for Special Assistance in the last 6 rounds of the season. Hence there are 38 observations (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) for analysis of the determinants of the average winning percentage of clubs eliminated from finals, but only 31 observations for analysis of the winning percentage of clubs with borderline eligibility for Special Assistance.
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